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Abstract
In the 25 years since the Mabo High Court decision, native title claims, 
litigation, determinations, and land use agreements have proliferated 
with the result that native title is now an undisputed component in the 
Australian nation’s core institutional framework. This has been a remarkable 
development. The emergence of public policy for native title over the past 
quarter century, built on a complex array of conceptual foundations which 
derive from Indigenous tradition, the common law, statute law, anthropology, 
history and politics, invites the question: what next? Where will native 
title policy be in 25 years’ time? What are the emerging issues which will 
most shape that future? This paper attempts to explore and answer those 
questions from a public policy perspective, adopting an explicitly political 
frame of analysis from international development theory, political settlement 
theory. Emerging issues of national, regional and local significance are 
considered and assessed from both the perspective of public policymakers, 
and Indigenous interests. It is argued that there are strong grounds for both 
policymakers and Indigenous interests dealing with native title issues to be 
more proactive than has been the case to date in managing the emerging 
strategic challenges identified.
Keywords: native title, Racial Discrimination Act, political settlement, land 
tenure, compensation for extinguishment, regional agreement, fiduciary duty
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Introduction
I n June 2017 it was 25 years since the High Court decision in Mabo v Qld (No.2). It is thus timely to 
look forward to the issues likely to emerge in the native 
title policy domain over the next 25 years and, perhaps 
more importantly, reflect on what might be done now 
to ensure both Indigenous interests and the nation as a 
whole are positioned to deal with those emerging issues 
inclusively and constructively. Before looking forward, 
it is important to place the High Court decision in Mabo 
and the subsequent Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) in 
strategic context.
While there is extensive literature on native title issues 
in the disciplines of law and anthropology, much less 
has been written from economic or political science 
perspectives. This paper adopts a public policy 
perspective, drawing on a range of disciplines, but 
ultimately focusing on potential policy changes in the 
native title domain which might emerge over the coming 
decades. In particular, the paper utilises recent theorising 
in international development contexts which focus on the 
political equilibria (or political settlements) which emerge 
in all societies, which operate to engender stability 
and allocate societal benefits through the panoply of 
institutions in place in each society. 
Context
The post-federation ‘Australian settlement’, the broadly 
shared values which underpinned Australian society 
such as protectionist trade policies, the ‘white Australia’ 
policy, membership of the British Empire, and wage 
arbitration, had effectively erased Indigenous people 
from the public sphere.1 It had been breaking down 
since the Second World War, and was fundamentally 
reconstituted following the election of the Whitlam Labor 
Government in 1972 after 23 years in Opposition. The 
Whitlam Government moved to modernise the nation’s 
human rights landscape, the enactment of the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (RDA) being perhaps the most 
significant landmark. The Whitlam Government also 
moved to give effect to the Commonwealth’s power to 
legislate with respect to Aboriginal affairs (a result of 
the 1967 referendum), established a Commonwealth 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs, and set in train the 
Woodward Royal Commission into land rights in the 
Northern Territory and its follow up, the drafting of the 
legislation which was ultimate enacted as the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) by 
the Fraser Government. Facilitating these changes 
was a fundamental shift in the attitudes and mindset 
of a majority of Australians in the major capital cities, 
particularly in the larger states, in relation to social 
issues including the place of Indigenous Australians in 
the nation.
However, in regional Australia and less urbanised 
states, earlier attitudes persisted, and by the mid 
1980s, legislation providing for Indigenous land rights 
had not been implemented in Western Australia and 
Queensland. An attempt by the Hawke Government 
to legislate national land rights foundered from both 
the right and the left of the political spectrum. On the 
right the state governments in Western Australia and 
Queensland opposed any suggestion of special rights 
for Aboriginal citizens. On the left Indigenous interests, 
particularly the influential Northern Territory land councils, 
were concerned that the existing rights in the ALRA, 
particularly the mining veto, would be dismantled in any 
national legislation. The proposed national land rights 
legislation was eventually shelved in 1985 by the Hawke 
Government under pressure from the Western Australian 
Government led by Premier Burke (Gardiner-Garden 
1994:19–25).
At the same time, however, Australia was seeking to 
engage more actively with the international community 
particularly in Asia on economic and trade issues, and 
dominant business interests in particular were keen to 
put the vestiges of the ‘white Australia’ policy to bed. In 
addition, on Indigenous jurisprudence and rights issues, 
Australia was lagging developments in other settler 
colonialist nations such as Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States. Notwithstanding a probable majority of 
Australians supporting greater land justice for Indigenous 
Australians, by the mid 1980s, the nation had reached 
a point of political gridlock. This gridlock reflected the 
substantial influence of the mining industry (in Western 
Australia in particular) that had run a concerted political 
and media campaign to counter the recommendations of 
the Seaman Inquiry into land rights in Western Australia 
and later the proposed national land rights model 
proposed by the Hawke Labor Government. 
Enter the High Court and its decision in Mabo. Setting 
aside the motivations or legal reasoning which led to the 
decision, it is instructive to assess the Court’s decision 
in terms of its impact on the extant ‘political settlement’ 
in Australia. In broad terms, the established equilibrium, 
or what development theorists term the ‘political 
settlement’ (see, for example, Di John & Putzel 2009; 
Khan 2010; Ingram 2014) amongst Australia’s dominant 
interest groups had changed since Federation. Race 
and the existence of racially distinct minorities were no 
longer seen as existential threats, and notions of ‘white 
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Australia’ and policies of overt race based exclusion 
were increasingly seen as an impediment to the global 
aspirations of dominant interest groups, particularly those 
representing larger internationally focused businesses. 
The High Court decision in Mabo thus brought the 
institutional framework which had derived from 
the original Federation-era political settlement into 
substantial alignment with the later contemporary shape 
of Australia’s political settlement. The Mabo decision 
acknowledged the prior ownership of land by Indigenous 
people, but not their prior sovereignty. It created (or 
technically ‘recognised’) a new sui generis form of title 
with unique characteristics: it was part of the common 
law and where native title existed, it was held to have 
always existed; its elements were determined by the 
customs of the title holders; it was communally owned; 
inalienable; and importantly would be extinguished by the 
grant of inconsistent interests by government. Critically 
however, the enactment of the RDA meant that any 
extinguishment since that Act came into force would be 
discriminatory and thus invalid if it did not provide for ‘just 
terms’ compensation in accordance with the Australian 
Constitution as is the case with the compulsory 
acquisition of mainstream titles.
The effect was to establish a clever compromise. 
The decision related to property, not sovereignty. It 
recognised that native title existed where Indigenous 
groups retained an ongoing connection with their country 
and there had been no intervening extinguishment of title 
by inconsistent crown grants. This meant that in many 
cases neither native title holders nor governments knew 
whether de jure native title rights continued in relation to 
particular tracts of land. It accepted the consequences 
of settlement by non-Indigenous Australians, leaving 
Indigenous non-native title holders (that is, those whose 
title had been extinguished through the process of 
settlement and colonisation) without recompense and 
compensation, unless their title had been extinguished 
post 1975. The compromise was particularly clever, 
because it involved a significant degree of entrenchment: 
while it cost comparatively little to determine the 
existence of native title, the financial cost of undoing it 
would be exorbitant for so long as the RDA and the ‘just 
terms’ provision in the Constitution remained in place.
At its core, the High Court’s decision in Mabo was 
political insofar as it substantially aligned the law with the 
shape of the extant political settlement, in circumstances 
where the nation’s political system and legislatures had 
been unable to effect that change.2
In response to the High Court decision, the then Keating 
Government set about drafting the NTA. It was driven 
by two synergistic political imperatives: the widespread 
sense of uncertainty in the community at large as to 
the security of their property titles (notwithstanding the 
terms of the High Court decision) and the refusal, at least 
initially, of a number of very powerful interest groups, 
notably the mining industry and the pastoral industry, 
supported by the West Australian, Northern Territory and 
Queensland Governments, to accept the decision. 
The Commonwealth Government, correctly in retrospect, 
decided to move quickly to formalise native title rights in 
legislation. The proposed legislation provided a process 
for determining where native title exists; established 
processes for dealing with putative native title in the 
period between claim and determination; established 
requirements for incorporation of native title holders in 
entities named Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBCs);3 
created a ‘right to negotiate’ provision in relation to 
proposed processes to explore and mine on claimed or 
determined native title land; and provided an assurance 
that non-Indigenous title holders had maximum certainty 
via the retrospective validation of all titles granted 
over native title tenure since 1975, with a concomitant 
provision for ‘just terms’ compensation. Even so, the 
process of drafting the native title legislation was mired 
in contention.
A public campaign was mounted against the Native Title 
Bill led by major industry interest groups and backed 
by state governments, particularly Western Australia 
(Russell 2006:287–305). Even after the Native Title Act 
became law, Western Australia initiated a challenge to 
the Act’s constitutional validity and also attempted to 
utilise a provision allowing the establishment of state 
based regimes to further limit the application of native 
title in Western Australia. Subsequently, the High Court 
confirmed the overall validity of the NTA and struck down 
the Western Australian legislation for inconsistency with 
the NTA and the RDA (Russell 2006:311).4
The point of this analytical vignette is to emphasise that 
native title came into existence as a result of changed 
attitudes both in the general community, and particularly 
amongst the implicit coalition of dominant interest groups 
which shape and ‘own’ the national ‘political settlement’. 
Notwithstanding political gridlock, the High Court 
decided to address the anomalies and injustice arising 
from the out-dated and counter-factual doctrine of terra 
nullius. Once the High Court compromise decision was 
taken, robust and vocal ‘pushback’ emerged from those 
interest groups who perceived themselves as ‘losers’. In 
the years which followed, in response to that pushback, 
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the equilibrium or political settlement in relation to the 
recognition of native title may have swung back in a 
regressive direction.5
Consequently, the legislative response to the Mabo 
decision was close run, and might easily have 
failed which would have led to a range of seemingly 
inconceivable consequences: pressure to repeal the RDA; 
pressure for an adjustment to the ‘just terms’ provision 
in the Constitution, and potentially to further and more 
explicit exclusion of Indigenous citizens and interests in 
Australian society. In the years since, the political turmoil 
which surrounded the native title legislation has settled 
down. Mainstream Australia has come to understand 
that the compromise put in place by the High Court 
does not represent a fundamental challenge to the major 
institutions relating to land, mining, and agriculture and 
thus does not fundamentally shift the nation’s ‘political 
settlement’ but rather brings the institutional framework 
for Indigenous land rights into alignment with the existing 
political settlement in Australia. Of course, the implication 
is that Indigenous hopes and expectations that Mabo 
might represent a radical overturn of the current political 
settlement have not eventuated. This has led to a 
degree of Indigenous disenchantment over the inherent 
limitations of native title, as the realisation that it did not 
necessarily advance their deeper political aspirations 
became clearer.
It is common to hear Indigenous activists criticise native 
title as being a complete sham. In a more nuanced vein, 
Noel Pearson in an article titled ‘Promise of Mabo not 
yet realised’ (Pearson 2010) made two broad arguments: 
that the opponents of Mabo continue to undermine the 
implicit bargain involved in the High Court’s decision 
and the NTA, namely that while settled Australia would 
effectively be off limits to Indigenous interests, ‘remnant 
lands’ would be available for claim and determination; 
and second, that the courts had lost their way, confusing 
the requirement for proof of continuity of traditional title 
with the nature of native title tenure. He was arguing 
in effect for a dynamic definition of the components of 
native title rights, not a static one set in concrete in 1788. 
Ritter’s assessment in his book Contesting Native 
Title was that there is little momentum for fundamental 
change, and the current native title policy consensus 
‘reflects underlying power relationships; it does not alter 
them’ (Ritter 2009:174). He concludes that: 
Existing assumptions and patterns of power relations 
conditioned by economics, ideology, history, society 
and politics will continue to shape the evolution of the 
consensus (Ritter 2009: 176).
To sum up, native title has been a significant and 
substantial change for the better, both for the nation 
as a whole and for Indigenous interests. But it has not 
met Indigenous expectations, and it is inherently limited 
by the reality that it is based on a compromise which 
fundamentally reflects the extant political settlement 
in Australia. 
This points to a number of implications which need to be 
kept in mind looking forward. The first is that the extent 
to which ‘progressive’ institutional changes or reforms 
involving pro-Indigenous change can be implemented 
is very largely determined by the shape of the extant 
political settlement in Australia. And just as importantly, 
to the extent to which the Australian political settlement 
changes in ways which further exclude Indigenous 
interests, the existing institutions such as the NTA and 
native title are at risk.6 
It follows that notwithstanding the Australian experience 
of the last 50 years, it is not inevitable that Indigenous 
interests will continue to be given a more inclusive role 
within the Australian political settlement. Moreover, 
the ubiquity and increasing influence of globalisation 
arguably increases the risks that Indigenous interests will 
lose relative power, and thus influence within Australian 
society. In those circumstances, the prospects for 
adverse changes to the Indigenous policy institutional 
framework, including the NTA, increase.7
It also follows that, from an Indigenous perspective, the 
first strategic issue to highlight related to native title (albeit 
one that is of contemporary as well as future significance) 
is the importance of building and sustaining broader 
political support for native title and its key buttressing 
institution – the RDA – in mainstream Australia and, 
to this end, of building the capacity to advocate and 
communicate Indigenous policy interests in the wider 
political system (at Commonwealth and state/territory 
levels) in a sustained and politically astute way. It is 
notable that unlike agricultural interests, mining interests, 
and business interests (all of whom have established and 
resourced substantial national organisations focused 
solely on advocating for their members’ interests), 
the Indigenous advocacy organisation for native title 
established in 2005, the National Native Title Council 
(NNTC), is effectively a shell, with minimal staff and 
resources. Admittedly, the NNTC’s constituent members 
– land councils and native title representative bodies 
(NTRBs) – are much better established and organised. 
However they necessarily have a primarily sub-national 
focus and remit, are largely dependent of public funding, 
and only occasionally do we see them enter the national 
policy debate, usually at the overtly political level once 
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governments have already determined a course of action 
which they perceive to be adverse to their interests.
The next 25 years
What then are the emerging strategic challenges for 
the coming 25 years? The answer depends on one’s 
perspective, since Indigenous interests and government 
policy makers will see this policy landscape through 
different lenses and with the benefit of widely variable 
histories and backgrounds.8 
The current Commonwealth Government has not laid out 
a comprehensive agenda for native title policy, but an 
examination of its views or response to three significant 
reports has provided some insights into its thinking, 
policy aspirations, and implicitly its expectations relating 
to the future.
Prior to losing office in 2013, the former Labor 
Government commissioned a report from the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC 2015). The report 
provided a detailed and largely technical assessment 
of the adequacy of the NTA in processing claims. The 
main issues raised were ‘connection’ requirements 
and continuity of traditional connection; the nature and 
content of native title (to reflect the Akiba decision9); 
authorisation provisions; joinder provisions; and claims 
resolution issues. To date, there has been no government 
response, which arguably suggests that native title is a 
second or third order issue for government.10 The fact 
that policy responsibility is in the Attorney General’s 
department means there tends to be a greater focus on 
litigation strategy than policy development.
The second report is the Government’s own White 
Paper on Northern Development (Australian Government 
2015) which ostensibly adopts a 20 year framework, and 
identifies a number of longer term reforms required in 
the native title policy space. The most significant are the 
development of a capacity for leases or ‘transferable 
interests’ to be able to be granted on determined native 
title11 and the reform of mainstream pastoral tenures to 
broaden the scope of allowed activities, which will require 
coexisting native title interests to be taken into account 
in as yet unspecified ways. In addition to these specific 
reforms, the White Paper includes a very strong focus on 
expanding the potential for native title land to be utilised 
for economic development (both by native title holders 
and external parties).
The third report is the 2015 Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) initiated Investigation into 
Indigenous Land Administration and Use (COAG 2015a) 
which recommends changes to claim processes, the 
removal of impediments to leases over native title land, 
and improved support for PBCs. COAG endorsed the 
report; but this was largely ‘in principle’12 and it does 
not appear that there is an intention to pursue legislative 
change either nationally or in any jurisdiction as a result of 
the report (COAG 2015b).
Perhaps the major long term issue to draw from these 
reports and their responses is that the Commonwealth 
Government sees a need to make native title tenures 
more accessible for economic development. But its 
policy agenda appears to be largely rhetorical, with 
little apparent progress on drafting legislative changes 
which would drive such an agenda. Nor has it pursued 
reform of related issues such as the development of 
appropriate state and territory based planning regimes 
which take account of the widespread existence of 
native title (Wensing 2016:51). The partial exception 
to this conclusion appears to be the Commonwealth 
Government response to the Federal Court decision 
in McGlade, which held that certain ILUAs required 
unanimous consent from native title holders, effectively 
forced the Government to legislate to overturn the 
decision and retrospectively validate a large number 
of existing ILUAs. The Government’s recent success in 
legislating these changes may encourage further policy 
action over the coming year.
The following discussion attempts to move beyond the 
limited perspective derived from an analysis of formal 
Commonwealth Government policy documents such 
as the ALRC review of the NTA or the White Paper 
on Northern Development, and attempts to provide a 
provisional and inevitably partial response to the question 
‘what are the emerging strategic challenges for the nation 
in the native title policy space? 
It seems useful to break the analysis down into three 
categories: local, regional and national.
Local issues
At the local level, there appear to be three broad sets 
of issues which exist today, but will inevitably become 
more contentious over coming decades: issues related 
to membership status as native title holders; financial 
issues; and the ongoing challenge of managing the 
Indigenous estate.
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The status and rights of membership of the native title 
holding group will come under increasing pressure from a 
number of sources: 
• the issues which will emerge as descendants of 
current native title holders (many no longer resident 
close to the land) seek to influence and play roles in 
determining land use activities13
• conflict between individuals and groups over their 
status as members of the native title holding group14
• the decisions of PBCs, which represent all native title 
holders for a particular determination (which may be 
extremely extensive) versus the rights of individuals 
who may have links to particular locations and/or 
places15 
• structural conflict between Indigenous occupiers of 
the land who are not native title holders and native 
title holders, particularly if native title holders are not 
resident on the land, but reside elsewhere
• conflict between native title holders over the policies 
and agenda of their PBC and associated commercial 
vehicles, and even over the specification and access 
arrangements related to customary rights (Prout 
Quicke, Dockery & Hoath 2017:78)
• structural (or implicit) conflict within native title groups 
where dominant individuals or sub-groups in essence 
railroad other native title holders in inappropriate ways 
(Prout Quicke, Dockery & Hoath 2017:37).
These issues clearly raise issues related to the underlying 
traditional processes of recognition of rights, status and 
responsibilities.16 These include the dynamic processes 
which enable the specification of rights to change or be 
modified over time – what we might term the informal 
institutions of native title ownership, versus the processes 
established in the wake of the NTA to create corporate 
entities which are recognised by and can engage with 
mainstream Australia – what we might term the formal 
institutions of native title ownership. In an ideal world 
the informal and formal institutions would be aligned 
(isomorphic). In the real world, there will always be a 
gap. Moreover, circumstances will inevitably arise where 
third parties (or dominant personalities within the native 
holder group) see merit in taking advantage of that gap or 
potential gap. 
Where conflicts or disputes involving membership status 
are litigated, the strong likelihood is that the courts will 
favour rights and processes under the formal institutions 
of native title. Such a judicial predisposition would 
arguably be unjust, or at least would have the potential to 
lead to unjust consequences and outcomes, but would 
be a direct consequence of the fact that native title has 
been incorporated into the common law of the Australian 
nation state. 
The policy implications for Indigenous interests are 
to ensure that the governance processes of PBCs 
and related native title entities both meet the formal 
requirements of the Australian state, but also reflect to 
the maximum extent possible the underlying informal 
institutions of traditional ownership and responsibilities 
for country. This requires more work and effort for 
corporation members and directors than is strictly 
necessary, but will create an organisational ‘culture’ 
(in the mainstream sense) of valuing underlying and 
traditional forms of doing business.17
There are two significant policy implications for 
governments and mainstream stakeholders. The first 
is the need to understand that by imposing formal 
institutional arrangements on top of traditional ways of 
deciding about country, mainstream Australia has both 
created new sources of potential conflict and imposed 
alien forms of operating (even though native title holders 
at least in theory control these new entities). This leads 
to a second implication, namely that governments should 
encourage native title organisations to reflect underlying 
customary and traditional norms in their decision making 
processes, respect their rights to continue to do so, and 
facilitate this to the extent possible. It is fair to say that 
governments have a particularly poor record on this front 
to date.
The second set of issues at the local level relate to the 
distribution and management of financial revenues by 
PBCs and associated corporate entities. These include:18
• key allocation decisions by PBCs and their associated 
trusts/entities relating to investment versus 
consumption of negotiated benefits or compensation 
payments, and 
• distributional decisions where benefits are allocated 
by PBCs (or associated entities) to consumption. 
The policy implications for Indigenous interests derive 
from the fact that the utility (subjective benefit) flowing 
from the allocation and use of financial assets by 
native title entities is a function of the preferences and 
aspirations of the native title holding group. That is, 
there is no a priori reason for preferring investment over 
consumption or vice versa. All allocational decisions 
involve risk and/or opportunity costs. What is important 
however is that native title holders are given the 
opportunity to make informed choices, and PBCs and 
NTRBs are best placed to ensure that this occurs.
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Facilitating informed choice is particularly challenging 
in cross cultural contexts, and in circumstances where 
individual native title holders may not have strong 
financial literacy, nor a background in commercial or 
investment activities. Moreover, the board members 
and senior staff of PBCs and NTRBs do not often have 
backgrounds in commerce, investment, or financial 
management (Prout Quicke, Dockery & Hoath 2017: 
77–78). In other words, most PBCs and NTRBs will not 
have internal access to the requisite financial skills to 
guarantee that appropriate financial options are laid out 
for native title holders prior to decisions being taken, 
and unless they have taken steps to access those skills 
externally, native title holders will be making what are very 
often irrevocable decisions without adequate information.
Moreover, the traditional dynamics of more traditional 
native title groups are such that consumption is usually 
preferred to saving and investment, and notions of 
equitable sharing are constrained by a range of factors 
such as local politics, individual status, kinship and 
ownership of particular sites or places.
Finally, the use of external advisers and staff by native 
title groups creates principal/agent problems, and 
this is exacerbated by the cross cultural nature of the 
principal/agent contracts.
Together, these three dynamics suggest that there may 
be an under-supply of informed choice in PBCs and 
associated entities dealing with financial issues. While in 
many or most cases the quantum of revenue may not be 
significant, in a small number the quantum is huge. 
The policy solution, which arguably falls primarily on 
NTRBs, is to work with PBCs to create governance 
arrangements which counter these three risks. 
However, NTRBs are funded by the Commonwealth 
Government, and there are strong policy reasons for 
the Commonwealth to give these issues much greater 
attention, including by funding NTRBs to specifically 
support the development of greater financial capacity 
within PBCs and associated entities.
The policy risk for the Commonwealth is that a 
failure to act proactively to facilitate strong financial 
management by PBCs and their associated entities will 
allow the development of a systemic financial capacity 
weakness amongst PBCs, and in the event of a future 
decision by the High Court to determine the existence 
of a Commonwealth Government fiduciary duty 
(Gover 2016), expose the Commonwealth Government 
to a significant liability. This risk is exacerbated by 
the fact that the Commonwealth does not provide 
adequate funding for PBCs. The only available funding 
appears to be the Capacity Building for Native Title 
Corporations program which is resourced at around 
$6 million per annum nationally, and is administered as 
part of the Commonwealth Government’s Indigenous 
Advancement Strategy. 
The third set of issues at the local level concern the 
responsibilities and opportunities which relate to the 
ongoing management of the Indigenous estate. While 
native title holders have successfully managed their 
country for millennia, the colonisation and settlement of 
the continent has led to new and potentially problematic 
responsibilities on all landowners, including native title 
holders: managing the impact of introduced exotic 
species of flora and fauna; environmental threats from 
climate change; the demands of managing coexisting 
rights with other landholders; and the potential for 
heightened regulatory compliance arising from 
state/territory and Commonwealth laws, to list the 
most obvious examples. While native title is inalienable, 
and is thus protected from loss (at least under current 
legislative arrangements), failure to meet regulatory 
obligations has the capacity to financially cripple PBCs 
and their associated entities, thereby adversely impacting 
Indigenous landowners’ use of their lands. 
One policy response available to native title holders is 
to pursue commercial opportunities on their lands and 
waters which hold out the prospect of creating a financial 
surplus which can be redirected to land and waters 
management. Examples include tourism, carbon farming, 
aquaculture and agricultural enterprises. Commercial 
enterprises require the investment of up-front capital, 
and introduce new, and potentially expensive commercial 
risks. These financial imposts and the potential for 
financial losses are additional elements which ought to 
be considered by native title corporations in allocating 
available financial revenues. They also raise very real 
issues related to the comparative merits of pursuing 
social versus individual commercial options on native title 
land (Kerins 2013). 
Apart from the obvious potential for profits, one 
advantage of the pursuit of commercial opportunities 
on the Indigenous estate is that it attracts government 
financial support via available mainstream business 
tax deductions. A downside however is that achieving 
commercial viability is entirely uncertain, involves 
significant risk of financial losses, and potentially subverts 
or diverts native title holders’ focus on engagement 
with country.
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A policy implication for government is to consider the 
benefit of strengthening support to the Indigenous 
Land Corporation (ILC), whose remit is specifically 
focused on supporting land management across the 
nation, including in relation to native title. The current 
Commonwealth Government has previously favoured 
an amalgamation of the ILC and Indigenous Business 
Australia (IBA), along with a stronger focus on ‘economic 
development’.19 Amalgamation of the two organisations 
would be short-sighted and potentially counterproductive 
as the issues facing the ongoing management of the 
Indigenous estate are much broader than a mere lack 
of economic or commercial development. In particular, 
it would be retrograde were Indigenous interests to lose 
access to an agency with a dedicated and explicit land 
management focus.
Regional issues
A number of emerging strategic issues link to the 
aspirations of many Indigenous groups for a stronger 
voice in regional politics in Australia. These aspirations 
reflect a realisation that much mainstream politics is 
regionally focused, along with the reality that Indigenous 
land ownership and social structures, while having strong 
local characteristics, are simultaneously regional.
Regional support for PBCs
In broader Indigenous affairs contexts, the policy benefits 
of greater regionalisation, and in particular, of exploring 
regional agreements have a long history. Following on 
from the largely successful regional councils under 
ATSIC, there have been a small number of regional 
agreements established over the past decade (e.g. in 
Groote Eylandt), though the level of ongoing commitment 
from government has more often waned than waxed. 
In native title contexts, notwithstanding the ever 
present centrifugal momentum towards smaller clan 
based arrangements, there is a strong policy case for 
considering regionally based management arrangements. 
Anthropologist Marcia Langton has recently canvassed 
the benefits of Aboriginal interests adjusting their mindset 
and making ‘a decision to escalate their administrative 
organisational capacity to a much higher level’, but she 
also noted the substantial resistance to date to this 
thinking among Indigenous interests (Langton 2015:181). 
While neither Indigenous interests nor governments have 
to date seriously advocated such a shift,20 the challenges 
of delivering support to large numbers of PBCs, and 
the benefits to Indigenous advocacy of utilising larger 
organisations to advocate for native title interests suggest 
that such a policy shift ought to be seriously considered. 
It would potentially reduce the numbers of PBCs requiring 
public funding, and would assist in strengthening 
Indigenous voices at regional levels. 
In such a scenario, new and additional funding would 
be provided either to existing NTRBs or to new bodies 
established specifically to take on the administrative 
obligations of PBCs (akin to the way land councils in 
the Northern Territory undertake the administrative 
functions of land trusts). Formal decision making powers 
would continue to reside with PBCs, but responsibility 
for facilitating necessary decisions would fall to the 
regional organisations. This system might be established 
either through legislation, or via funding agreements. 
It potentially has the capacity to add value in terms 
of the governance challenges identified above, and in 
turn, the smaller number of regional bodies managing 
administrative matters would facilitate strengthened 
and appropriate regulatory oversight of PBCs either by 
government or perhaps by NTRBs.
In the absence of a much larger financial commitment 
by the Commonwealth Government to fund all PBCs, the 
policy implications of not pursuing some version of this 
proposal will be the continuation of a myriad of small and 
largely ineffective PBCs, who are vulnerable to financial 
failure, at risk of inappropriate influence by third parties, 
and who do not have the capacity to address the land 
management challenges they will inevitable confront over 
coming decades. In addition, there will be increasing 
demands on government for funding of PBCs, many 
of which do not have the scale to effectively manage 
complex land management and financial management 
issues.21
Alternative negotiated regional pathways
The substantial volume of outstanding claims, the 
costs for both governments and Indigenous interests 
in litigating them, the potential costs for governments 
of post 1975 compensation for extinguishment, and the 
potential for increasing uncertainty as to outcomes for 
all stakeholders suggests that the scope for negotiated 
outcomes exists and will increase, and that the expected 
comparative payoffs from negotiation versus litigation 
will begin to tilt toward negotiation. Indeed, the recent 
ALRC review of the NTA noted that various elements 
of the legislation, for example the requirement to prove 
continuity of connection, slowed down the pace of 
determining claims considerably (ALRC 2015:102–07; also 
Chapter 6).
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There are already indications that stakeholders are keen 
to explore alternative pathways to litigation of native title 
matters: in Victoria the state government has made a 
number of native title agreements with Indigenous groups 
since 2000, and in 2010 enacted the Traditional Owner 
Settlement Act 2010 which provides a formal framework 
and process for reaching agreements outside of the 
native title claims process. The Victorian framework 
also provides a vehicle for underwriting the long term 
sustainability of PBCs. This legislation has been utilised 
for the Gurnaikurnai Settlement Agreement made in 
October 2010, and the Dja Dja Wurrung Recognition 
and Settlement Agreement made in 2013.22 In Western 
Australia, substantial progress has been made towards 
finalisation of the Noongar native title settlement (Kelly & 
Bradfield 2015), and the legislative amendments following 
the McGlade decision will probably clear the way for 
Noongar settlement to be finalised over the next year.
These types of approaches are likely to gain momentum 
given the increasing appreciation that such processes 
have the potential to deliver real benefits to regional 
areas and create sustainable corporations able to exploit 
economic and cultural opportunities. This momentum 
might also be further enhanced by the commitment of 
some state and territory governments to negotiating 
‘treaty’ arrangements that could conceivably look to 
enhance the attractiveness of such settlements to 
Indigenous interests.
To date, the Commonwealth Government has been 
quite passive in this area, presumably content to leave 
the financial and policy responsibility to the states and 
territories. Yet the failure to adequately fund, and build 
capacity of native title corporations, particularly PBCs, 
has been a tangible constraint on progress down these 
alternative pathways; the Commonwealth Government 
appears to have been rather short-sighted in this respect 
as the consequence of a failure to negotiate outstanding 
claims will be that the Federal Court and its claim process 
will be left with the ongoing burden, with a concomitant 
expansion of legal costs for all stakeholders. 
A policy implication for Indigenous interests is to ensure 
that those agreements which have been made are 
implemented effectively. In particular, governments 
must be kept up to the mark, their performance in 
meeting their commitments constantly monitored; and 
the opportunities which have been created by these 
agreements for Indigenous interests need to be grasped. 
This requires effective organisational capacity under 
Indigenous control.
In conclusion, the complex mosaic of overlapping native 
title determinations, ILUAs, negotiated settlements, 
and the like might form an integral foundation for wider 
regional policy agreements. Such agreements would be 
tethered to Indigenous property rights and thus could not 
be ignored or discarded by governments as have many 
of the erstwhile regional agreements made in Australia 
to date. Thus these land title ‘mosaics’ built on formally 
recognised property rights could eventually form the 
foundation for negotiated treaty outcomes at regional 
levels and at least in theory, more broadly.
National issues
At the national level, the emerging strategic issues can 
usefully be categorised as those impacting governments: 
the Commonwealth Government and the states and 
territories together, and those which primarily impact 
Indigenous interests. 
Governments 
For governments, perhaps the most obvious of these 
relates to compensation for extinguishment of native title 
and validation of the replacement mainstream titles since 
1975. We have recently seen in the Federal Court decision 
in Griffiths23 an indication that the courts are prepared 
to adopt a more nuanced and expansive interpretation 
of what the ‘just terms’ requirement amounts to in 
relation to native title. One specific implication worth 
noting is that the quantum of ‘just terms’ compensation 
will be context specific; in other words, the cultural 
history and experience of each native title group will be 
relevant to calculating the compensation, and this will 
inevitably require anthropological and possibly other 
professional assessment.
Perhaps the most innovative and far reaching aspect of 
the Griffiths decision by Justice Mansfield relates to the 
nature of the intangible costs which were imposed on the 
native title holders whose ownership was extinguished 
by the actions of the Northern Territory Government 
in 1994. Compensation for the intangible costs of a 
compulsory acquisition is a recognised element in 
Australian (and British) common law. It is often referred 
to as ‘solatium’. In many statutes which recognise it, it 
is capped. Mansfield’s assessment referred to it as the 
non-economic impacts of the acquisition, in other words, 
the impacts on Aboriginal culture, on connection to 
country, on sacred sites and so forth. This is an appealing 
distinction to draw, and is intuitively justifiable.
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However, many anthropologists would emphasise the 
hybrid nature of culture and economy, and indeed 
Mansfield in his recent decision in Rrumburriya,24 a 
native title case based on land near Borroloola, found 
that native title rights could include a range of economic 
and commercial components or elements. It follows 
that the intangible impacts of extinguishment will not 
be quarantined to non-economic, religious or cultural 
matters, but will potentially impact on economic 
rights. It may be argued that any such economic rights 
are incorporated into the value of the title linked to 
comparative freehold values, and there is some merit 
in this. However the economic activities that non-
Indigenous land owners undertake on land are limited in 
comparison to the range of potential economic activities 
which are incorporated into native title. 
Nevertheless, policy is made and implemented in most 
areas of public policy on the basis of limited information, 
and with a focus on simplification aimed at establishing 
general rules or approaches which can then be adopted 
without having to re-prosecute de novo every new 
circumstance. Mansfield’s approach, while perhaps 
conceptually conservative, appears likely to form the 
basis of the approach to intangible costs into the medium 
term future. The new Northern Territory Government has 
decided to appeal the Mansfield decision in Griffiths, and 
thus it is not certain that Justice Mansfield’s approach 
will be endorsed by the superior courts. Nevertheless, 
even a minimalist jurisprudence on compensation based 
on equating native title value to freehold values will raise 
significant issues for governments into the future.
The Griffiths case opens a new chapter in the national 
narrative on native title. It will shift the focus of public 
discussion and debate away from the processes of native 
title claim and determination, more squarely toward the 
ongoing and continuing extinguishment of native title 
(dispossession) since 1975. However, claim processes 
will remain important given that all compensation claims 
will require a determination of the existence of native 
title immediately prior to the extinguishing act. For 
governments at all levels, (all things being equal) there 
will be a likely requirement to defensively litigate even 
more claims (what we may term ‘compensation claims’), 
and where the claims are successful governments 
will need to appropriate funds for the ‘just terms’ 
compensation required.
There is little evidence on the public record as to the 
potential contingent liabilities facing state and territory 
governments, though it seems likely that Western 
Australia and perhaps other jurisdictions will have 
prepared internal estimates. There is a potential for 
the compensation costs to be significant particularly 
in locations where there has been expansion of towns 
with potentially thousands of residential blocks since 
1975. So for example, the action of the Western 
Australia Government in negotiating the Yawuru native 
title settlement agreements in 2010 following the 
determination of native title for the Yawuru would have 
been driven at least in part by the potential compensation 
implications flowing from the growth of Broome in recent 
years and previous Western Australia governments’ 
failure to fully observe the Future Act provisions of 
the NTA.
Offsetting the urgency of this potential or contingent 
liability for governments is the reality that native title 
claims, cases and negotiations move slowly, giving 
governments plenty of time to adjust and prepare for the 
inevitable compensation costs. However the capacity 
of governments to slow down native title processes in 
order to defer difficult or unpopular decisions to a future 
administration is a very real threat, both to the individual 
Indigenous groups involved and also at a systemic level 
to the nation as a whole which has a national interest in 
seeing these issues resolved expeditiously. The courts 
have a potential role here insofar as (following Mansfield) 
they could both determine that interest should be paid 
on delayed just terms compensation to former native 
title holders, but also take into account (perhaps through 
higher ‘penalty’ interest rates) that there is a high degree 
of injustice involved in delayed or prolonged native 
title processes. 
Of course the existence of a national interest in resolving 
native title issues does not necessarily mean that the 
Commonwealth Government will engage; indeed, it is 
arguable that over the past 25 years, the Commonwealth 
Government has largely stepped back from proactively 
addressing these future policy challenges. This has been 
a function of a number of factors: the placement of policy 
responsibility for the NTA with the Attorney General’s 
portfolio, which inevitably means that the focus is on 
case by case management of litigation; the absence of 
sustained pressure from stakeholders, and in particular 
states and territories, for early resolution of native title 
issues; and the strategically short-sighted decision 
of the states and territories to reject (or not accept) 
the Keating Government’s offer to pay 75% of state 
and territory compensation liabilities (the states were 
arguing that the Commonwealth Government should pay 
100%). At present, there is no effective Commonwealth 
Government commitment to underwrite state and 
territory compensation liabilities, and as a consequence, 
the Commonwealth Government does not see it as 
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in its interest to manage the issue so as to minimise 
overall costs.
What is clear however is that at some point in the 
next 50 years, and potentially in the next 25 years, 
the issue of native title compensation will shift from 
policy background to foreground, and at that point, 
the Commonwealth Government will be brought into 
the equation, if only because for every dollar the states 
spend on compensation, there is an opportunity cost 
in foregone government services elsewhere. The 
issue also has the potential to play into the relativities 
assessments by the Grants Commission which underpin 
the distribution of untied Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
revenues to the states and territories. It follows that 
the Commonwealth Government will eventually see the 
systemic issues shaping compensation liabilities in the 
states and territories as being not only in the national 
interest, but as warranting federal action or intervention.
One obvious course of policy action which the 
Commonwealth Government might adopt is to actively 
support the moves underway in some jurisdictions for 
alternative settlements (discussed above). An explicit 
policy stance of supporting such agreements at the 
national level would encourage laggard jurisdictions to 
develop appropriate frameworks, and would potentially 
limit the overall quantum of compensation costs for 
taxpayers. 
In this context, some may query the ethics of seeking to 
minimise compensation. One obvious response is that if 
the quid pro quo is that Indigenous interests move from 
being excluded from the national political settlement to 
being included within the extant political settlement, with 
all the potential economic, social and cultural benefits 
that are entailed, then that is an equation that they may 
find attractive. At the end of the day however, whether 
or not governments seek to encourage alternative 
settlements, Indigenous interests will always have a 
choice regarding whether to participate. 
A further issue for the Commonwealth Government 
relates to the effective use of agreement monies by 
Indigenous interests, and in particular, whether the 
Commonwealth Government has a potential oversight 
role. In contrast to statutory land rights regimes where 
the Commonwealth Government has a formal regulatory 
oversight role, in relation to native title, its status as an 
inherent property right (which is part of the common 
law) means that the Commonwealth Government has 
a minimal formal regulatory oversight role. In particular 
it cannot legislate to control or regulate the use of 
native title payments (i.e. funds derived from native title 
agreements) without risking legal claims arguing that 
it has acquired a private interest and must pay ‘just 
terms’ compensation. It does have the ability to regulate 
corporations, but must do so on a non-discriminatory 
basis unless it wishes to over-ride the RDA, a step 
bound to attract widespread political opposition from 
mainstream interests. 
Nevertheless, the use of native title payments is 
potentially politically sensitive, and were for some 
reason a major political issue to emerge around the 
use or ‘misuse’ of native title payments, particularly if 
external advisers were diverting funds away from native 
title holders, then there would be considerable pressure 
on governments to be seen to be acting. The amounts 
involved are potentially large, and while they may not 
expand in the future following the cessation of the 
resources boom, the life span of the relevant agreements 
extend well into the next decade and in some cases 
beyond. In the event that it were to become clear at 
some point in the future that regulatory failures had led 
to widespread diversion of native title payments away 
from relevant beneficiaries, the likelihood of a successful 
fiduciary duty claim against the Commonwealth 
Government would increase significantly.25 Such an 
eventuality is most likely if the relationship between the 
underlying political settlement and the terms of political 
debate fall out of alignment. Of course, if the terms of the 
political settlement moves adversely against Indigenous 
interests, then the courts are less likely to decide 
governments have a fiduciary duty, and indeed could 
even wind back the terms of the current native title laws.
There were previously proposals advocated by the 
Minerals Council of Australia and some Indigenous 
leaders for the introduction of a mechanism to facilitate 
tax deductibility for investments derived from native 
title payments, an issue strongly opposed by Treasury 
because of its concerns it would open a potential 
floodgate for tax evasion (not necessarily by Indigenous 
interests). Following consideration by a Working Party 
comprising officials and key stakeholders (Treasury 
2013), the Treasury ultimately determined to close down 
the potential vulnerability by determining that all native 
title payments were ‘compensatory’ and thus tax-free. 
In June 2013, legislation was passed to retrospectively 
remove the tax liability for native title payments back to 
2008 (Ashurst 2008). While this was a plus for Indigenous 
interests, it removed the scope for an incentive structure 
tilted towards investment over consumption to be 
introduced, which had clearly become a concern for 
at least some of the major resource development 
corporations (Murray & Wright 2015:148–149). The 
outcome thus reinforces the arguments made above 
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in support of proactive measures to ensure native title 
holders are able to make informed choices regarding the 
allocation of native title benefits. 
While a number of the major resource development 
corporations are clearly concerned at the potential for 
public disquiet to emerge in relation to agreements 
they have signed and payments they have made, it is 
also clear that not all resource developers share those 
concerns, and indeed, may even see it in their interests 
to establish ‘loose’ payment structures which allow key 
individuals to benefit at the expense of the broader native 
title group. 
It follows that there is an argument for establishing a 
robust corporate governance regime over native title 
payment arrangements while respecting the rights of 
native title holders to make informed choices. The most 
effective means of doing this is through the various 
corporate regulation schemes. Many native title groups 
utilise numerous corporate vehicles to implement their 
financial strategies, often incorporated under different 
legislative regimes, thus ensuring that no single regulator 
can ever oversight the totality of the group’s commercial 
and corporate activity. Addressing these types of 
challenges requires a level of coordination and political 
leadership across all jurisdictions which to date has not 
been in evidence. Improved and proactive regulatory 
oversight arrangements for native title corporations are in 
native title holders’ interests, in the national interest, and 
also in national policy makers’ interests.
Indigenous interests
For Indigenous interests, the emerging strategic issues 
are different depending on whether native title has been 
determined or is considered to exist and has not yet been 
determined. A third category (perhaps the majority of 
Indigenous citizens) which ought not to be forgotten are 
those who have had their native title rights and interests 
extinguished prior to 1975 without compensation by the 
Australian nation state.
Perhaps the most obvious emerging national strategic 
issues for the next 25 years in the native title domain 
are those facing native title holders. Building on the 
challenges discussed above in relation to local issues, 
there is a pressing need for the NNTC to be expanded 
into a stable and sustained national voice to articulate 
native title holder aspirations and advocate pro-native title 
holder policy. This challenge is largely organisational, but 
requires the development of a longer term perspective 
and implementation plan. Effective long term advocacy 
requires building the capacity to engage with all 
sides of politics, the development of a secure funding 
base independent of government, and robust internal 
governance which assists in resolving inevitable internal 
conflicts constructively and expeditiously.
Putative native title holders also have a national-level 
interest in having their views advocated effectively to 
government and other influential stakeholders. While each 
native title group has potentially difficult choices to make 
in relation to their own country (e.g. as between litigation 
and negotiation), Indigenous interests nationwide have 
an interest in learning what other groups have done 
both in their litigation and negotiation strategies. There 
is probably a reasonably effective informal network of 
lawyers, anthropologists and Indigenous leaders who 
share this type of information, but we are approaching 
a time when a degree of formalisation might ensure 
that relevant information is diffused efficiently and in a 
timely fashion. Again, this is a potential role for a national 
advocacy organisation.  
A further potential role for an upgraded national native 
title advocacy organisation relates to the development 
of a strategy and resources to proactively manage 
the potential concerns of governments relating to 
the financial policies of native title corporations. The 
creation and sustenance of a ‘culture’ of informed and 
conservative financial management amongst native title 
corporations will do much to pre-empt the potential for 
governments to intervene over the coming decades, as 
well as contributing to better quality decision making on 
the ground.
In relation to the situation of Indigenous peoples who 
have been dispossessed without compensation, there 
are numerous non-native title aspirations and issues 
which require attention and advocacy. These issues span 
the Indigenous affairs policy agenda. However, there is 
one native title related institution which deserves more 
strident and robust support at national and regional levels 
from native title groups. 
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Account26 
was initially established by the NTA, and has been 
progressively and incrementally adjusted over the past 
25 years to make the revenues it produces less amenable 
to Indigenous oversight and more embedded within 
government. The Account is a special account for the 
purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA), and has a balance 
of $2 billion at 30 June 2016. Its revenues are used 
to provide annual appropriations, independent of 
government control, to the Indigenous Land Corporation 
(PMC 2016:204–206). 
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Here is not the place to provide an account of the 
recent travails of the ILC, but suffice to say that the 
Commonwealth Government has previously sought to 
amalgamate the ILC with IBA and has more recently 
reverted to an interim step of amalgamating the 
back office functions of the two organisations. The 
consequence of any future amalgamation would be 
that the revenue stream of the Land Account would 
inevitably be directed away from land based investments. 
Given the size and challenges of successfully and 
effectively managing the Indigenous estate, such a policy 
appears retrograde.
The potential of the Land Account to assist Indigenous 
groups who for one reason or another have been 
unable to regain or access their traditional country is 
substantial,27 but it is being inexorably engulfed by the 
bureaucratic systems of the Commonwealth. There is 
a strong case for the ILC and the Land Account to be 
effectively privatised, divested from government control 
and re-established as an independent Indigenous 
controlled institution. This would necessitate both 
successfully resisting the current attempts by government 
to ‘colonise’ the Account and incorporate it into the 
Commonwealth Government’s budgetary priorities. In 
order to persuade a future government to divest, it will 
be necessary for Indigenous interests and the combined 
Indigenous native title leadership to develop a robust 
implementation strategy. Again, this is a potential role for 
a strengthened NNTC.
The analysis in this paper categorises the emerging 
strategic issues in native title under three headings: 
local, regional and national. It also examines the issues 
from the perspective of Indigenous interests and those 
of policy makers and governments, particularly the 
Australian Government. The emerging strategic issues 
are summarised in Table 1.
Conclusions
Native title has been a major institutional change to 
Australia’s legal system and in particular its land laws. 
Twenty-five years on, the nation is still working through 
the implications of this seismic shift. In particular, it is 
too early for policy makers to take their hands off the 
tiller and leave developments entirely to the vagaries of 
interest group competition, untouched by a firm national 
vision of what native title institutions should look like in 
25 years’ time. After all, the extent of native title means 
that it covers and affects an extraordinary expanse of 
the continent.
In attempting to think through the emerging strategic 
issues for the next 25 years, this analysis has adopted 
a largely positive (as opposed to normative) analytic 
frame. In other words, it is focused on what is rather 
than what might be. In contrast to much writing on 
native title, the focus in this paper is not on aspirations 
such as Indigenous sovereignty, or improved access to 
human rights, but rather attempts to inject a degree of 
realism by basing the analysis on the inchoate equilibrium 
or ‘political settlement’ in Australia – which in effect 
determines the shape of the institutions which deliver 
benefits to the dominant coalition of interests which ‘own’ 
that settlement. 
A key implication of this analysis is that to the extent 
that the Australian political settlement becomes more 
inclusive of Indigenous interests, there will be greater 
scope for changes to native title and land rights which 
acknowledge and recognise Indigenous needs and 
aspirations.28 However, to the extent that the Australian 
political settlement becomes less inclusive, Indigenous 
interests will struggle to retain the benefits embedded in 
the NTA and associated institutions. 
There is no guarantee of perpetual progress, and 
Indigenous interests’ relative political and economic 
influence is vulnerable to external changes in Australian 
and global society. Whether the future political settlement 
in Australia is more or less inclusive of Indigenous 
citizens, Indigenous interests will be better positioned to 
deal with what emerges, be it threat or opportunity, if they 
are organised and independently funded to advocate for 
and influence policy.
Professionals working in native title, particularly 
anthropologists and lawyers, have much to offer, both to 
Indigenous interests and governments. The complexity 
of working in a fluid and developing field of law, replete 
with cross cultural tensions and dilemmas, make for 
extraordinary challenges. The guiding principles of 
effective work in these contexts should be a commitment 
to facilitating or assisting Indigenous groups to make 
informed choices, and this includes ensuring that 
Indigenous decision makers consider and take into 
account the ‘bigger picture’. The purpose of this analysis 
has been, in large measure, to begin a discussion about 
some of those systemic and ‘big picture’ issues.
An overarching conclusion for Indigenous interests is that 
they should allocate greater resources to advocacy and 
political organisation in order to ensure that the wider 
political system cannot ignore Indigenous aspirations and 
concerns in making decisions. In particular, Indigenous 
interests need to strengthen their focus on protecting and 
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TABLE 1. Summary of emerging strategic issues in native title
Strategic issues Implications for Indigenous Interests Implications for Governments 
Local issues
Status and rights of membership of 
native title groups
Ensure governance processes of PBCs 
and native title corporations are robust
Encourage and facilitate hybrid 
organisational structures for native title 
corporations which reflect both formal 
and informal customary norms.
Distribution of financial revenues from 
native title agreements
Commit to ensuring native title 
holders are provided with opportunity 
for making informed choices and 
decisions
Act proactively to facilitate and 
encourage strong financial 
management of PBCs and native title 
corporations
Management of the Indigenous estate Consider greater commercial use of 
the Indigenous estate
Strengthen the commitment to 
retaining the Land Account and 
the ILC
Regional issues
Exploring greater regionalisation Work towards ‘changed mindsets’ 
which are more open to greater 
regionalisation
Consider funding models for PBCs 
based on region-wide support
Alternative negotiated settlements Consider merits and trade-offs 
involved in negotiated settlements vis 
a vis litigation
Ensure an ongoing focus on 
implementation of existing agreements
Consider greater proactive support 
(including from the Australian 
Government) for alternative 
settlements in states and territories in 
order to limit future litigation costs
National issues
Compensation for extinguishment Prioritise claims to maximise political 
leverage – this requires system wide 
leadership
Address the systemic incentives 
to defer and delay resolving 
compensation claims, e.g. through 
national policy support for alternative 
settlements
Introduce more proactive regulation of 
native title corporations
Strengthened national advocacy of 
Indigenous native title interests 
Strengthen the NNTC
Engender a ‘culture’ of robust and 
ethical financial management in native 
title corporations
Develop a strategy to implement 
plan to ‘privatise’ and divest into 
Indigenous control the Land Account 
and the ILC
Facilitate greater inclusion of native 
title interests in the policy making 
process to counter the likelihood of 
future political gridlock
Upgrade funding to the PBC system
Resolution of bulk of outstanding 
native title claims, including 
‘compensation claims’
Explore greater use of negotiated 
settlements
Explore greater use of negotiated 
settlements
Provide more targeted  support for 
capacity building of PBCs
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advocating in support of the institutional gains that have 
been made in the past, as without active support there is 
the very real prospect that those gains will incrementally 
(and invisibly) erode and disappear.
For government, the overarching argument of the analysis 
is that there are systemic challenges and dynamics which 
require proactive attention, particularly from a national 
perspective. 
There is the possibility for the Commonwealth 
Government that a future High Court will determine 
that like Canada and New Zealand, the Commonwealth 
Government owes Indigenous citizens, and in particular 
dispossessed native title holders, a common law fiduciary 
duty. Indeed, the likelihood of such a decision is arguably 
in inverse proportion to the quality of national policy 
making on native title and Indigenous policy generally 
over coming decades. 
Such a determination in the future would potentially 
amount to a ‘new Mabo’ and would potentially upend 
the terms of the current relationship between the state 
and Indigenous peoples in Australia. The best way for 
governments to manage this possibility is to develop 
and implement policies which are proactively inclusive 
of Indigenous interests, and to facilitate the development 
and emergence of a stronger and independent advocacy 
voice for native title interests in the future. This would be 
win/win, being both in the national interest and of benefit 
to Indigenous interests. 
Of course, governments are largely constrained by the 
parameters of the political settlement in place at any 
time. However, there is always some scope for political 
leadership and agency, and visionary proactive policy 
making can shape key institutions within the existing 
political settlement, and sometimes even influence the 
shape of the political settlement itself. 
Native title is already deeply embedded within Australia’s 
institutional framework, and is unlikely to disappear or be 
overturned. The challenge for the nation is to ensure that 
the institutions of native title work as well as possible, and 
continue to provide inclusive opportunities for Indigenous 
Australians. The alternative is not in the national interest.
Notes
1.  See the discussion in Kelly (2009:25-27; 267-8) which 
recounts the role of the Hawke / Keating governments in 
finally laying the post-Federation Australian settlement 
to rest.
2.  In an interview published in December 2016, Chief Justice 
French noted that the Courts do have a legitimate lawmaking 
role: ‘There is an incremental lawmaking function that 
everybody has recognised as legitimate. Sometimes, of 
course, there is debate about whether judges have gone too 
far. Mabo was such a decision. We have all settled down 
about that now and there has been a statute which sets up 
the process by which the common law is to be applied. But 
none of that detracts from the proposition that judges do 
have a legitimate lawmaking role. It is a fantasy to pretend 
otherwise’ (Merritt 2016:27).
3. PBCs are sometimes referred to as Registered Native 
Title Bodies Corporate (RNTBC) or merely as native title 
corporations. The term native title corporations is used here 
to include PBCs and associated corporations established 
to receive and administer native title payments under 
agreements with third parties.
4.  Western Australia v Commonwealth of Australia (1995), 183 
CLR 373.
5. That regressive adjustment to the political equilibrium was 
perhaps most evident in the outcome of the debate over the 
response to the later High Court decision in Wik which, with 
the support of Tasmanian independent Senator Harradine, 
ultimately led to further amendment of the NTA to amongst 
other things, substantially expand the scope and operation 
of the validation provisions in the NTA (further constraining 
the potential for successful Indigenous claims), and to 
guarantee certainty in relation to the future renewal of a vast 
number of leases and Crown grants.
6.  Indeed, given the symbolic significance of native title in 
Australian public life, it may well be the case that changes to 
native title institutional frameworks will be the mechanism by 
which the political settlement is made either more inclusive 
or more exclusionary.
7.  This reality has already been amply illustrated by the 
2004 decision to simply abolish the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) rather than institute 
appropriate reform. The implications of this decision in terms 
of the disempowerment of Indigenous interests are over 
time becoming more apparent at both the local, regional and 
national levels, including in the centralisation of power and 
decision making in the hands of a single Commonwealth 
minister, and the tenuousness of the voice of Indigenous 
advocacy nationally.
8. Other stakeholders, such as businesses with interests or 
potential interests in native title land, will have their own 
perspectives. These perspectives are not included in the 
analysis here.
caepr.anu.edu.au
9. The High Court in Akiba on behalf of the Torres Strait 
Regional Seas Claim Group v Commonwealth (2013) 250 
CLR 209 upheld the notion that the right to take resources 
under native title should be conceived as a widely-framed 
right, and as it applied to the facts in Akiba, was a right to 
access and to take resources from the identified waters for 
any purpose.
10.  The Federal Court decision in McGlade, which opened 
the prospect that many Indigenous Land Use Agreements 
(ILUAs) might be invalid, and the consequent immediate 
action to introduce an amendment bill to Parliament which 
is largely based on one of the ALRC recommendations, may 
have raised the profile of a Commonwealth Government 
response to the ALRC report within the Government. 
Refer to the evidence of Attorney General’s Department 
officials before the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs Legislation Committee Hearing into the Native Title 
Amendment (Indigenous Land Use Agreements) Bill 2017 on 
13 February 2017.
11.  Arguably this is already possible at least in relation to 
determined exclusive possession native title.
12.  Refer to the extract from the COAG Communique: ‘COAG 
considered the report of the investigation into Indigenous 
land administration and use that it commissioned in 
October last year. To better enable Indigenous land 
owners and native title holders to use rights in land for 
economic development, jurisdictions will implement the 
recommendations of this report subject to their unique 
circumstances and resource constraints’ (COAG 2015b).
13.  Burke (2013) discusses the emergence of an Indigenous 
‘diaspora’ linked back to traditional communities, but 
resident in various regional and metropolitan locations.
14.  Palmer (2009) discusses the various ways that land holding 
groups can be conceptualised by anthropologists and 
lawyers, thus implicitly acknowledging that Indigenous 
notions of landholding group membership are potentially 
fluid, multivalent, context specific and innately political. 
See the recent decision of the Federal Court in Peterson on 
behalf of the Wunna Nyiyaparli People v State of Western 
Australia (No 2) [2017] FCA 289 for an example of the type of 
conflicts which can emerge in he claims process.
15.  Weiner (2007), discussing Sutton (2003) and citing Merlan 
(2008) explores the changing implications of residency off-
country for the assertion and exercise of traditional rights 
in country. Occupancy (in the form of ongoing foraging over 
particular tracts of land), was never according to Sutton 
(2003:26) the prerequisite for assertion of rights to country, 
but as Merlan (1998:111) notes the relationship of traditional 
owners to their country changed as they moved from 
foraging to permanent residence in nearby towns and even 
further afield. This leads to fundamental changes in the ways 
in which ownership rights are conceptualised over time. 
As Wiener (2007:158) notes: ‘The disparity of knowledge 
and experience of country in Aboriginal country groups is a 
colonially engendered one and must at some point represent 
a real break with  the phenomenological experience of 
landedness that existed at the threshold of colonisation’.
16.  The recent ALRC review of the NTA was largely premised 
on the ALRC’s recognition that ‘traditional laws and 
customs may adapt, evolve or otherwise develop’ over 
time (ALRC 2015:137). However, the likelihood that a 
Government will take up these recommendations without 
some external political driver appears rather slim, at least in 
the short term. Note the comments above in relation to the 
McGlade decision.
17.  But see Martin (2004) for a contrary argument. He suggests 
that ‘there are compelling arguments for establishing 
Indigenous corporations which leave as much social and 
political process as possible within the informal Indigenous 
realm and do not attempt to codify it within formal corporate 
governance mechanisms’ (Martin 2004:74). What is common 
ground is that informal Indigenous norms and values will 
be influential, and perhaps even predominant. The policy 
judgement for Indigenous interests boils down to whether 
to manage the inevitable interactions between formal and 
informal dynamics inside or outside the relevant corporation.
18.  Prout Quicke, Dockery & Hoath (2017:78) list five challenges 
arising from their case studies related to the management of 
financial resources arising from native title agreements.
19.  This policy appears to have been shelved in favour of an 
interim step, the amalgamation of the back-office functions 
of both organisations. Refer to Minister Scullion’s comment 
to this effect in the 3 March 2017 Estimates Hearings of the 
Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee at 
page 4.
20.  Strelein & Tran (2013:37 and footnote 73) indicate that a 
2002 review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations 
Act recommended ‘direct funding [of PBCs], either via 
representative bodies or through a regional support model’. 
This doesn’t appear to be a formal recommendation of the 
2002 Review, but there is discussion of the potential for a 
multiplicity of PBCs and overlapping memberships (refer 
Corrs Chambers Westgarth 2002:283).
21.  There is also a structural challenge embedded in the current 
arrangements. Where a PBC which has been unfunded (or 
substantially underfunded) is suddenly required to deal with 
a major land use or development proposal, it is faced with 
having to scale up and build organisational and negotiation 
capacity (often funded by the proponent which is a problem 
in itself) as well as simultaneously negotiate the access 
arrangements. Thus the inevitable structural inequity and 
negotiating power between the proponent and the native 
title corporation is further exacerbated.
22.  Refer to the Department of Environment and Primary 
Industry website for further details: www.depi.vic.gov.
au/forestry-and-land-use/managing-land/indigenous-
land-management/agreements-with-traditional-owners, 
accessed 17 January 2017.
23.  Griffiths v Northern Territory (No 3) 2016 FCA 900.
24.  Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group v Northern Territory of 
Australia 2016 FCA 776.
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25.  Prout Quicke, Dockery and Hoath (2017: 86) point to a gap in 
the regulation of native title related trusts, and recommend 
the appointment of a specific public trustee office to service 
PBCs, essentially to minimise the risks arising from the 
potential for advisers to act unscrupulously in relation to the 
revenues of native title agreements.
26.  It was originally named the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Land Fund.
27.  Bearing in mind that many native title groups do not have 
access to the whole of their country and they too stand to 
benefit from the ILC and the Land Account.
28.  It is worth noting however that inclusion is a relational 
concept, and being included on adverse terms may 
involve continuing disempowerment (Hickey, Sen & 
Bukenya 2016:5–6).
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